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ABSTRACT
One of the overriding issues concerning private human spaceflight concerns how to properly regulate this specific new type of
activity. Noting that in the discussion regarding regulation thereof usually the three distinct regimes of space law, air law and
high-risk adventure tourism law are drawn upon to look for solutions, the present paper addresses the key elements of each of
these approaches as they are to some extent already currently being applied and where, as a consequence, gaps and overlaps
arise, as well as presents an effort to address the latter in a sensible, coherent, efficient and feasible manner.
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1. Introduction: The Hybrid Character of Private Human
Spaceflight
When a new development arises, for the purpose of trying
to devise a proper system of law and regulation lawyers always tend to look for existing regimes that might be of application, or at least of help, in order not to have to reinvent
the wheel all over again. This also applies to private human
spaceflight, defined for the present purpose as ‘‘flights of humans intended to enter outer space (a) at their own expense
or that of another private person or entity, (b) conducted by
private entities, or (c) both.” Thus, it is important to note that
from a technical and operational perspective private human
spaceflight encompasses many aspects from three fields of
human activity in particular: space activities, aviation, and
high-risk adventure tourism.
Firstly, as to the space aspect. Of course private spaceflight
and its most visible component space tourism not accidentally make reference to outer space: the aim is to reach at least
the lower parts of that area.” Whilst even the plans currently

being close to realization already vary from air-launched second stage spacecraft to single-stage horizontal take-off vehicles, all of them make use of some form of rocket propulsion
for the middle section of the flight profile. All are intended
to reach a realm where the atmosphere is, if at all present,
thin enough to result in some form of ‘re-entry’ into the (real)
atmosphere as part of the downward part of the flight profile. Whether for fun or for scientific experiments, all present
1
See e.g. L. Billings, Exploration for the masses? Or joy-rides for the
ultra-rich? Prospects for space tourism, 22 Space Policy (2006), 163;
R.D. Launius & D.R. Jenkins, Is it finally time for space tourism?,
4 Astropolitics (2006), 254-5, 272-4; J. Loizou, Turning space tourism
into commercial reality, 22 Space Policy (2006), 289-90; R.S. Jakhu &
Y.O.M. Nyampong, International regulation of emerging modes of
space transportation, in J. Pelton (Ed.), Space Safety Regulations and
Standards (2010), 219-20; E. Walter, The privatisation and commercialisation of outer space, in C. Brünner & A. Soucek (Eds.), Outer
Space in Society, Politics and Law (2011), 500-1; M. Gerhard, Space Tourism—The Authorisation of Suborbital Space Transportation, in F.G.
von der Dunk (Ed.), National Space Legislation in Europe (2011), 279-88.
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micro-gravity as a major selling point of their ventures. Some
in addition also advertise with selling points such as views
of the curvature of the earth and the atmosphere. All these
are elements typically associated with spaceflight. Markets
to be targeted concern the servicing of public (as this has already happened with the International Space Station2) or private (Bigelow’s soon-to-be space hotels) destinations orbiting in outer space.
Secondly, also comparisons with aviation abound.3 Historically, the development of aviation, with prize money inciting daredevils like Charles Lindbergh and auguring in a first
phase of flying largely for the sheer excitement of it, finds
many echoes in the current stage of private manned spaceflight. Much of the technology in particular for the first phases of the flight profile comes straight out of aviation—or, for
example in the case of Virgin Galactic, simply includes an
aircraft as a ‘first stage’ vehicle. Most of the flights envisaged
for the near future will use airports for take-off and landing,
will only for a small, upper part of the hyperbolic flight profile leave what is commonly referred to as ‘airspace’—and
will consequently also interfere with normal aviation activities taking place in the area. At a later stage, furthermore,
some of the technologies are intended to be used for pointto-point aviation-like transportation across the globe. Here,
the space-part of the trajectory is more like a helpful incident
than a main target or a crucial element of the flight.
Thirdly, at least as long as the discussion still concerns private flights of a few hours at most and landing where they
took off, they are indeed comparable also to tourism, more
specifically high-risk adventure tourist activities such as
bungee jumping, helicopter-skiing or survival treks.4 These
are all activities voluntarily undertaken by paying customers
essentially for the fun and thrill of it as they are, after all, not
without certain inherent dangers.
2
Cf. e.g. Billings, 163; S. Negoda, Legal Aspects of the Commercial Development of the Russian Segment of the ISS, 28 Air & Space
Law (2003), 90-4; R. Sattler, US Commercial Activities aboard the International Space Station, 28 Air & Space Law (2003), 79-81; L.J. Smith
& K.U. Hörl, Legal Parameters of Space Tourism, Proceedings of the
FortySixth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2004), 38-9; R.P. Veldhuyzen & T.L. Masson-Zwaan, ESA Policy and Impending Legal
Framework for Commercial Utilisation of the European Columbus
Laboratory Module of the ISS, in F.G. von der Dunk & M.M.T.A.
Brus, The International Space Station Commercial Utilisation from a European Perspective (2006), 62.
3
See e.g. S. Hobe & J. Cloppenburg, Towards a New Aerospace
Convention? Selected Legal Issues of “Space Tourism,” in Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2005),
378-81; P. van Fenema, Suborbital Flights and lCAO, 30 Air and Space
Law (2005), 399-403; R. Abeyratne, Space Tourism—Parallel Synergies Between Air and Space Law?, 53 Zeitschriftfiir Luft- und Weltraumrecht (2004), 184 ff.; Gerhard, 268-78.
4
See e.g. T. Knutson, What is “Informed Consent” for Space-Flight
Participants in the Soon-to-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33
Journal of Space Law (2007), 105 ff.; Z.N. O’Brien, Consumer Protection and the Limitation of Liability in the National Regulation of the
Space Industry, Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Colloquium on the Law
of Outer Space (2006), 229-32; Z.N. O’Brien, Advertising of Private
Commercial Space Services in the European Community, Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2007), 50;
A. Cartier & I. Cristoiu, Space Tourism: Regulatory Framework of
Private Initiatives and Projects with a Special Interest on RLV Regulations, Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (2007), 39.
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It is not surprising then that also the three respective legal
regimes for those categories of activities in principle and/or
at first sight bear great relevance to the impending private
human spaceflight activities.5 This may lead to the possibility of overlaps of applicable regimes and the resulting overall
incoherence or inversely, since no single regime can claim to
be comprehensively applicable, even to gaps in law and regulation. Choices will therefore have to be made, and those
choices will not necessarily all point in the same direction.
Prior to actually making such choices, however, at least an
evaluation needs to be undertaken of the key characteristics
of those three regimes, of space law, air law and high-risk
adventure tourism law respectively. Such an analysis, moreover, should at least ideally be undertaken at both the international level and at the level where individual states address the issues legally speaking. This is the main target of
the current article.
2. Space Law and Private Human Spaceflight
The application of space law to private human spaceflight
principally derives from the framework at the international
level, more in particular the four treaties developed in the bosom of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS) in the course of the 60s and 70s which were
widely ratified.6 In this context, national law has taken a backseat, generally being established after (and in first instance
mainly as implementation of) those international treaties.
The most fundamental provisions stem from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,7 which established a number of rules applicable to a realm labelled ‘outer space’ on the basis of legally characterizing that area as a ‘global commons,’ which
is a realm where no territorial sovereignty of any individual state can apply.8 States are held internationally responsible for any activities in that realm as long as these can be
qualified as “national activities” of the state in question, and
are consequently obliged—at least if they are held to be the
Most of the analyses referenced in footnotes 1, 3 and 4 supra actually also address in some detail the applicability of the respective
regimes.
6
Cf. e.g. S. Freeland, Up, Up and ... Back: The Emergence of Space
Tourism and Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space, 6
Chicago Journal of International Law (2005), 4-6; Hobe & Cloppenburg,
380-1; Jakhu & Nyampong, 220-4.
7
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington,
done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS
205; TlAS6347; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
8
See e.g. Artt. I, II, VI, Outer Space Treaty. Further e.g. on the hoax
of ‘ownership’ of parts of the moon e.g. the IISL Board of Directors
Statements at <http://www.iislweb.org/docs/IISL Outer Space
Treaty Statement.pdf) and <http://www.iislweb.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf); also P.M. Stems & L.I. Tennen, Privateering and
Profiteering on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Debunking the
Myth of Property Rights in Space, Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Colloquiumon the Law of Outer Space (2003), 58-62; F. Tronchetti, The NonAppropriation Principle under Attack: Using Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty in its Defence, Proceedings of the Fiftieth Colloquium on
the Law of Outer Space (2008), 526-36; F.G. von der Dunk et al., Surreal estate: addressing the issue of ‘lmmovable Property Rights on the
Moon,’ 20 Space Policy (2004), 149-56.
5
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“appropriate State” to do so—to undertake proper “authorisation and continuing supervision” of such activities.”
This is one angle from which individual states have found
it necessary to establish national space laws and regulations
for cases where such national activities in outer space are undertaken by non-state actors, read essentially private commercial operators. In particular with respect to private human spaceflight (which really started being developed only
in the first years of the present millennium), the international treaties alluded to did not provide much relevant detail.
Therefore it was—and still is—largely up to such national
law and regulation to address the specifics of this novel type
of space activities.
In cases where states had such national laws already in place
for private space activities not involving manned spaceflight,
it was a logical step to first and foremost consider extending
the scope of, and adapting such legislation to this end. The
only state having actually done so is the United States, which
since 1984 had a national law, including a licensing system
for private launch operators, in place with the enunciation of
the Commercial Space Launch Act in its original version.10
The resulting regime was adapted to address the specifics of
private human spaceflight, for the first time in 2004 by means
of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act11 and as
further elaborated by the FAA Human Space Flight Requirements.12 Moreover, in recent years individual states within
the United States have started to proclaim statutes governing private human spaceflight, such as Florida, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia, as will be discussed further below.13
Essentially, these statutes try to make the respective states
more attractive (still) to potential providers of private human
spaceflight services.
Several other states possess a national space law and are
currently engaged in plans for private human spaceflight but
as of yet have not in any meaningful sense adapted it for the

Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty. Cf. also e.g. E. Back-Impallomeni,
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, United Nations Treaties on Outer Space: Actions at the National Level; Proceedings United Nations/Republic of Korea Workshop on Space Law (2004), 75; E. Back-Impallomeni, Necessities for the Development of National Space Law, in C.
Brünner & E. Walter (Eds.), Nationales Weltraumrecht/National Space
Law (2008), 28-30.
10
Commercial Space Launch Act, Public Law 98-575, 98th Congress, H.R. 3942, 30 October 1984; 98 Stat. 3055; Space Law Basic Legal
Documents, E.111.3; now codified as 51 U.S.C. Chapter 509. See further F.G. von der Dunk, Private Enterprise and Public Interest in the European ‘Spacescape’ (1998), 111-8; I. Marboe & F. Hafner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mechanisms in Implementation
of the UN International Space Treaties, in F.G. von der Dunk (Ed.),
National Space Legislation in Europe (2011), 40-2; P.A. Vorwig, Regulation of Private Launch Services in the United States, in R.S. Jakhu
(Ed.), National Regulation of Space Activities (2010), 405-19.
11
Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, Public Law 108492, 108th Congress, 23 December 2004; 118 Stat. 3974; now codified
as 51 U.S.C. Chapter 509.
12
14 C.F.R. §§ 401 ff., Human Space Flight Requirements for Crew
and Space Flight Participants; Final Rule 71, FR 75615 of 15 December 2006.
13
See infra, § 4.
9
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purpose. This concerns Sweden14 (in the light of Virgin Galactic’s plans to launch from Kiruna), the United Kingdom15
(notably concerning ideas to develop a private spaceport
in Scotland), the Netherlands16 (with a view to the plans of
Space Expedition Curaçao (SXC) to launch from the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) and France17 (in
view of apparent interests to develop such operations from
the center of the country).
In order to, inter alia, implement the state responsibility
those states felt they might incur for possible private (so far
unmanned) ventures into outer space, those laws generally
included licensing and oversight requirements and competences with respect to private operators holding the nationality of the state concerned, operating from the territory of the

14
Cf. Act on Space Activities, 1982: 963, 18 November 1982; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 398; Space Law Basic Legal Documents, E.II.1; 36 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht
(1987), at 11; http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/national/sweden/act on space activities 1982E.html; and Decree on Space
Activities, 1982: 1,069; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I
(2001), at 399; Space Law Basic Legal Documents, E.ll.2; 36 Zeitschriftfiir Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 11; http://www.unoosa.org/
oosa/en/SpaceLaw/national/sweden/decree on space activities
1982E.html. See already Von der Dunk, Private Enterprise, 129-34;
further e.g. Marboe & Hafner, 34; N. Hedman, Swedish Legislation
on Space Activities, in C. Brunner & E. Walter (Eds.), Nationales Weltraumrecht/National Space Law (2008), 73-80.
15
Cf. Outer Space Act, 18 July 1986, 1986 Chapter 38; National Space
Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at 293; Space Law Basic Legal
Documents, E.I.; 36 Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at
12; http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1986/38/introduction.
See already Von der Dunk, Private Enterprise, 134-41; further e.g.
Marboe & Hafner, 35-6; S. Mosteshar, Regulation of Space Activities in the United Kingdom, in R.S. Jakhu (Ed.), National Regulation of
Space Activities (2010), 359-62.
16
Cf. Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and
the Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects, 24 January 2007;
80 Staatsblad (2007), at 1; Nationales Weltraumrecht/National Space Law
(2008), at 201; http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/national/netherlands/space activities actE.html. See further e.g. Marboe & Hafner, 37-8; H. de Brabander-Ypes, The Netherlands Space
Law An introduction to contents and dilemma’s, Presentation held
at the 47th session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, http://www.oosa.unvienna.
orgjpdfpresnsczmajpres-nz.pdf, last accessed 4 May 2012; F.G. von
der Dunk, Regulation of Space Activities in The Netherlands, in R.S.
Jakhu (Ed.), National Regulation of Space Activities (2010), 225-45.
17
Cf. Law on Space Operations (Loi relative aux operations spatiales);
Loi no 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008; 34 Journal of Space Law (2008), at 453;
unofficial translation 34 Journal of Space Law (2008), at 453. See further
e.g. Marboe & Hafner, 39-40; P. Clerc & F. Cahuzac, Advance in the
Implementation of the French Space law on Space Operations in the
Launcher Field, Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law
2009 (2010), 400-6; P. Achilleas, Regulation of Space Activities in France,
in R.S. Jakhu (Ed.), National Regulation of Space Activities (2010), 10912; A. Kerrest de Rozavel & F.G. von der Dunk, Liability and Insurance in the Context of National Authorisation, in F.G. von der Dunk
(Ed.), National Space Legislation in Europe (2011), 155-61.
18
For a more extended overview, cf. F.G. von der Dunk, Towards
‘flags of convenience’ in space?, Paper presented at the llSL/ECSL
Symposium at the occasion of the opening session of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
Vienna, 19 March 2012, to be published in Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 2012 (2013).

202									

state concerned, or both.18 Further specific national policies
or idiosyncrasies were also reflected. For example, the US act
also applied to companies majority-owned or controlled by
US Citizens,19 the UK act very much was drafted to address
satellite communications20 and the Dutch act for the time being did not, for internal political reasons, extend to the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom.21
As mentioned, states are internationally responsible under
the Outer Space Treaty for private space activities in outer
space. The delineation thus required of a realm labelled ‘outer space’ as set off against a realm of air space of course translates into the issue of where, vertically speaking, outer space
begins, for the purpose of determining where the elements of
the regime of space law sketched above would be applicable.
To summarize the ongoing discussion on this issue: whilst so
far no authoritative, international agreement has arisen on a
clearly defined borderline between air space and outer space,
a tendency may be discerned to increasingly but informally
accept such a borderline at a 100 km above sea level, which
may (or may not) develop into a proper customary rule of international law.22 At the same time, with present-day aircraft
usually only capable of flying up to much lower altitudes
than a 100 km and satellites so far requiring to be operated
at altitudes of well over a 100 km in order to stay in orbit,23
the need for establishing such an exact borderline may not
be immediate.
19
See Secc. 50904(a X3) juncto 50902(1)(c), 51 USC Chapter 509. This
was largely for national security-related considerations.
20
Cf. Sec. 2, Outer Space Act; in the perceived absence of likelihood
at the time especially of launches conducted on UK territory the Act
did not ipso facto apply to space activities conducted from UK territory, only to space activities conducted by UK companies as defined
which de facto at the time concerned satellite communications only.
21
See Sec. 2(1), Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, it should be added, had ratified all five UNdeveloped space treaties also on behalf of the Caribbean dependencies, including Curaçao.
22
Cf. e.g. the case of Australia, which amended its 1998 space act in
2002, redefining “launch,” “return” and “space object” by replacing
the reference to “outer space” with the phrase “an area beyond the
distance of 100 km above mean sea level;” Sec. 8, An act about space
activities, and for related purposes, No. 123 of 1998, assented to 21
December 1998; National Space Legislation of the World, Vol. I (2001), at
197; as amended by Act No. 100 of 2002; http://www.comlaw.gov.
au/Details/C2010C00193. See further on this issue e.g. F. Lyall & P.
Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise (2009), 153-73; Freeland, 6-10; Gerhard,
280-82; S. Hobe, Legal Aspects of Space Tourism, 86 Nebraska Law Review (2007), 441-2; T. Neger & E. Walter, Space law, an independent
branch of the legal system, in C. Brunner & A. Soucek (Eds.), Outer
Space in Society, Politics and Law (2011), 239-41; M. Chatzipanagiotis,
The legal status of space tourists in the framework of commercial suborbital flights (2011), 617; earlier already C.Q. Christel, The Modem International Law of Outer Space (1982), 502-11.
23
However, authors rather diverge on altitudes quoted: B. Cheng,
Studies in International Space Law (1997), 448, refers to approximately
50 miles (80 km) (while at 450 pointing at one satellite actually having achieved a perigee as low as 96 km); likewise E.C. Dolman, Astropolitik: Classical Geopolitics in the Space Age (2002), 115, refers to
some 52 miles (or some 83 km); Lyall & Larsen, 168, refer (rather tentatively) to some 90 km/48 miles; J.J. Sellers, Understanding Space:
An Introduction to Astronautics (2004), 73, refers to some 130 km (or
about 81 miles); E.P. Chatters, B. Eberhardt & M.S. Warner, Orbital Mechanics, in AU-18 Space Primer (2009), 97, refer to some 150 km
(some 93 miles).
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The situation in terms of setting off outer space as a different legal realm from air space, however, is considerably
more complex. Some other parts of the space law regime are
tied in not so much with where an event takes place, but with
whether a ‘space object’ is involved, almost regardless of where
such a space object may find itself. Most prominently, this concerns the international law developed for liability caused by
space activities, which has been constructed as a regime for
liability caused by such space objects as per Article VII of the
Outer Space Treaty and the whole of the follow-on 1972 Liability Convention.24
The first problem here, also relevant for private human
spaceflight, is the absence of a definition of ‘space object’
(other than a rather circular one which includes the “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle
and parts thereof’ in the concept).25 The general opinion may
well hold this to refer essentially to any manmade artefact
‘launched’ into outer space, but this still begs the questions
(1) where outer space would begin and (2) what the word
‘launch’ refers to.26 The former question has, of course, already been briefly addressed above.
As to the latter question, the underlying assumption was
perhaps that a launch constituted a kind of vertical departure aiming at entering outer space using rocket engines.
Any such assumption, however, may well have been ‘corrupted’ by air launches conducted for example by Pegasus.
In such cases, the proper spacecraft was released from underneath an airplane in mid-air where the very first part of
the trajectory essentially is a horizontal one—whose activities were still legally defined as ‘launches’ at least for the
purpose of the Liability Convention.27 As a consequence, as
of today there is no singular, generally accepted legal definition of ‘launch.’
With a view to possible application of the applicable regime
to private human spaceflight, this makes it more likely to apply the label of ‘space object’ to some of the technical/operational concepts for private human spaceflight (e.g. Blue
Origin, Armadillo Aerospace) than to others (e.g. the XCOR
vehicle, as this essentially constitutes an aircraft-like vehicle
able to take off, traverse the air space and enter outer space
in one seamless operation), with two-stage vehicles (such
as WhiteKnightTwo-plusSpaceShipTwo) somewhere in between. However, where the boundary lies between what
should be considered a space object and what not is far from
clear-and there would be excellent arguments for including
even XCORtypes of vehicles within the concept of ‘launch,’
for the simple reason of its intention to reach outer space.28
A second key issue in the context of private space activities
results from the, in principle, fourfold definition of the liable
entity, the “launching State,” as the “State which launches or
24
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects (Liability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, done 29 March 1972, entered into force 1 September 1972; 961
UNTS 187; TIAS 7762; 10 ILM 965 (1971).
25
Art. I(d), Liability Convention.
26
See e.g. B. Cheng, Studies in International Space Law (1997), 324-6,
esp. 464, 493-5; Hobe & Cloppenburg, 381.
27
Thus, Pegasus as a US company operating from US territory required licenses under the Commercial Space Launch Act for such activities.
28
Cf. also Gerhard, 264-5; Chatzipanagiotis, 17-25.
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or procures the launching of a space object (... ) [and/
or the] State from whose territory facility a space object is
launched.”29 In other words, one or more states will be held
liable on the international level also for damage caused by
space objects privately constructed, launched and/or operated—a liability, moreover, which is in principle without Iimit.30 Consequently, along the same lines as state responsibility, which has given rise to a (small but growing) number of
states taking the initiative to establish a national space law
cum-licensing system, the liability which these states would
incur has led them to prominently include in such systems
and the resulting licenses clauses regarding reimbursement
of such state liability and attendant insurance obligations for
the licensees concerned.
Here, once again states have been exercising their own discretion regarding how to handle reimbursement and insurance. Some states concerned, such as Sweden, have chosen to
essentially shift the unlimited liability to the licensee, barely
allowing for exceptions.31 Others, such as the United States,
have in a fundamental way limited the reimbursement obligations, effectively turning the national treasury into an insurer of damage above the limit of such obligations.32 Some
states moreover require insurance statutorily, whether up to
a limit or not, whereas others leave that to the individual licensing process.33
Furthermore, the lack of precision in the international terminology has led different states to apply their national regulatory and licensing regimes in different fashion. What, for example, should be included in the concept of ‘procurement’ of
a launch, so as to require a license including liability arrangements? States have, indeed, also here chosen varying interArt l(c), Liability Convention.
Cf. Art. XII, Liability Convention, providing in relevant part:
“The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay
for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in respect of the damage as
will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condition
which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.”
31
Cf. Sec. 6, Act on Space Activities; under this clause a limit to the
reimbursement can only be granted when “special events” would
so justify.
32
Cf. Sec. 50912(a), Commercial Space Launch Act.
33
Of the five states particularly relevant from the perspective of impending human spaceflight, the United States (see Sec. 50912(a)(1),
Commercial Space Launch Act), the Netherlands (cf. Secc. 3(4), 12,
Law Incorporating Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry of Space Objects) and France (see Art. 6,
Law on Space Operations) require insurance by statute; the United
Kingdom (as per Sec. 5(f), Outer Space Act) “may (…) require[e] the
licensee to insure himself’ (emphasis added) but has in fact established a policy to always do so; whereas the Swedish Act on Space
Activities does not refer to ‘insurance’ or any related obligation at
all. See C. Gaubert, Insurance in the Context of National Authorisation, in F.G. von der Dunk (Ed.), National Space Legislation in Europe
(2011), 165-74; cf. also Marboe & Hafner, 61-5.
34
Amongst the five states of special interest here, currently only the
United Kingdom (see Sec. 1(a), Outer Space Act) and France (see Art.
2(3), Law on Space Operations) explicitly require a license ipso facto for the procurement of a launch. The other three states only upon
closer analysis do require licenses for certain (but differently delineated) sets of activities which could qualify as ‘procurement’ argu29
30
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pretations, giving rise to varying scopes of actual licensingcum-reimbursement obligations.34 Any lack of an internationally harmonized legal framework for private space activities would become a real issue especially now that other national authorities than the FAA are being forced to consider developing specific regimes for private manned space
activities.
On the other hand, as of yet development of a de facto harmonized legal framework cannot be ruled out. The Dutch
and Curaçao authorities for example may well follow the
US approach in substance when it comes to regulating
SXC’s activities (even if partly because vehicle developer
XCOR is a US company). Likewise, the Swedish authorities at least originally were contemplating a similar approach for Spaceport Sweden (even if partly because Virgin Galactic’s technology and Virgin Galactic itself are also
of US nationality). With regard to other projects currently being discussed it is probably fair to say that these are
not yet advanced enough to allow any distinct conclusion
as to the regulatory and licensing approaches that will be
undertaken.
A final point to be made here specifically with a view to
private human spaceflight is that international space law
does not provide for any regime regarding liability of
spaceflight operators to humans on board of their spacecraft.35 In the era when the space treaties were drafted (as
well as for some time thereafter) all such humans were astronauts in the service of public space agencies, not in any
true sense ‘passengers’ contracting for a (transport) service.
Consequently any liability in case these humans would suffer injuries or death was regulated, if at all, through their
employment contracts. This constitutes probably the most
prominent area of private human spaceflight where currently (international) space law does not provide for any
helpful pointers.
3. Air Law and Private Human Spaceflight
In contrast to space law, air law has been primarily developed at a national level, then harmonized in certain areas
at the international level. At both levels, moreover, the approach has once more been twofold.
On one hand, many of the legal rules that were developed simply apply to ‘airspace’; a definition thereof by
way of limiting its vertical extension long being considered a purely academic issue. The 1944 Chicago Convention36 provides the baseline here. It spells out the main obligations for international aviation and consequently to
that extent narrows the sovereign discretion of national
authorities to regulate such air transport from their end.
In that capacity, it restates the fundamental rule that “every State has complete and exclusive soverieignty over the

(footnote continued)
ably. See also Marboe & Hafner, 53-4.
35
This is of course, as will be seen further below, in complete contrast
to national and international air law.
36
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention),
Chicago, done 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947: 15
UNTS 295; TIAS 1591; ICAO Doc. 7300.
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airspace above its territory,” and only refers to its horizontal extension.37
On this basis, states have established within their national territories and airspaces a comprehensive set of domestic rules regarding navigation, safety of aviation and allowing (or conditioning, or even prohibiting) the transport of
passengers. This, subject only to such general international
rules as came to be agreed upon and ratified by the state at
issue, for example in the context of the same Chicago Convention. This Convention, it should be added, turned out
to focus on the navigation and safety aspects of international aviation, for example addressing air traffic management,
air traffic control, certification of aircraft and licensing of air
crews.38 The commercial aspects of air transport were largely
dealt with by the famous system of bilateral air service agreements between individual pairs of states. The mirror-side to
such, within the broad parameters of the Chicago Convention rather comprehensive, sovereign discretion to regulate
even international aviation as far as a state’s own airspace
was concerned was the fundamental responsibility of states
for the safety of such air transport in that airspace.39
Thus, in as far as private human spaceflight involves airspace—which it inevitably does, in the case of the current
projects even for a major portion of the flight—such rules
could, in principle, also be applicable to such flights, at least
to that extent.40 The same would apply to bilateral air service
agreements, once a next phase of private human spaceflight
would see passengers being transported from A to B (both A
and B being places on earth).
On the other hand, a considerable amount of rules of air
law mirrors the discussion on ‘space objects,’ as they are triggered by a vehicle being involved which conforms to the definition of an “aircraft,” being “any machine that can derive
support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.”41 The
use of the word “can” points out that, with the exception of
craft which can only operate in a completely ballistic mode,
all envisaged vehicles for private human spaceflight would

fit the bill, and hence entail application of the regimes which
the existence and operation of aircraft trigger. Strictly speaking therefore, it is not necessary for a vehicle to actually “derive” such “support” for any portion of the flight to qualify as aircraft, as long as it would at least have (had) the option to do so.
Thus, the application of both the contractual liability and
third-party liability regimes of air law is made contingent
upon transport on board of aircraft.
The contractual liability regime ranges from the 1929 Warsaw Convention42 to the 1999 Montreal Convention.43 It effectively requires states parties to establish alternatively harmonize national law requiring aircraft operators to compensate
damage caused to passengers and cargo on board of aircraft
in the course of transportation by such aircraft (or during
embarkation or disembarkation)44 in accordance with whatever terms the relevant treaty regime prescribes. Which treaty is applicable precisely in which given case moreover is not
determined by the partisanship of the state in whose airspace
a particular aircraft happens to be flying at the time of the incident, but by the partisanship of the states of departure and
arrival of the flight at issue.45
Third-party liability was most recently—on the international level—regulated by the 1952 Rome Convention46 as
later amended by the 1978 Montreal Protocol.47 It has to be
noted here that a 2009 Convention48 has not yet entered into
force and that the amount of states parties to the Rome Convention and the Montreal Protocol is fairly limited, making
national law applicable forthwith in the majority of cases. In
all cases, the application of the liability provisions are contingent upon an aircraft being the cause of the damage concerned, as already the titles of the aforementioned documents amply make clear.
Further complicating the general picture, the application
of criminal air law rests upon a combination of the applicability of the concepts of ‘aircraft’ respectively ‘air space.’
The first treaty to address the issue was the 1963 Tokyo
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention), Warsaw,
done 12 October 1929, entered into force 13 February 1933; 137 LNTS
11; USTS 876; UKTS 1933 No. 11. Cf. e.g. Hobe & Cloppenburg, 37880; Chatzipanagiotis, 86-93.
43
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (Montreal Convention), Montreal, done 28 May
1999, entered into force 4 November 2003; 2242 UNTS 350: ICAO
Doc. 9740; 48 Zeitsctmft fur Luft- und Weltmwnrecht (1999), at 326. Cf.
e.g. Chatzipanagiotis, 94-5.
44
Cf. e.g. Art 17, Warsaw Convention; Art. 17(1), Montreal Convention.
45
Cf. e.g. Art. 1(2), Warsaw Convention; Art. 1(2), Montreal Convention.
46
Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to
Third Parties on the Surface (Rome Convention), Rome, done 7 October 1952, entered into force 4 February 1958; 310 UNTS 181; ATS
1959 No. 1; ICAO Doc. 7364. Cf. e.g. Chatzipanagiotis, 141.
47
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface Signed at Rome on 7 October 1952 (Montreal Protocol), Montreal, done 23 September 1978,
entered into force 25 July 2002; ICAO) Doc. 9257.
48
Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by Aircraft to
Third Parties, Montreal, done 2 May 2009: not yet entered into force;
ICAO Doc. 9919. See further e.g. Chatzipanagiotis, 141-7.
42

37
Art. 1. Chicago Convention, resp. Art. 2, providing: “For the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be
the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State.” See further e.g. Gerhard, 268; Freeland 7-8; J.B. Marciecq et al., Towards Regulating Suborbital Flights: An Updated EASA Approach, Paper IAC-IO
D2.95, 61st International Astronautical Congress, Prague, 2010, 2.
38
Cf. esp. Art. 22-36, Chicago Convention. Further e.g. Van Fenema, 401-3; Marciacq, 2.
39
Cf., further to the general concept of state responsibility in international law, Art. 28, Chicago Convention, which was interpreted to give rise to this specific state responsibility in conjunction with
such general rules on responsibility of a state for events and activities within its sovereign jurisdiction as per public international law.
See also e.g. Artt. 12, 22, 25. See further F.P. Schubert, An International Convention on GNSS Liability: When Does desirable Become
Necessary? 24 Annals of Air and Space Law (1999), 252-4; M. Bartkowski, Responsibility for Air Navigation (ATM) in Europe, 21 Annals of
Air and Space Law (1996), 46 ff.: Chatzipanagiotis, 144.
40
See esp. Gerhard, 268 ff.
41
E.g. Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention, Aircraft Nationality and
Registration Marks, 5th edition, July 2003, Definitions: Annex 8, Airworthiness of Aircraft, 10th edition, April 2005, Definitions.
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Convention.49 It provided that the state in whose airspace
an aircraft registered with another state is flying is the primary state entitled to exercise its “criminal jurisdiction over
an offence committed on board”—although the former state
should not do so unless other criteria apply.50 Additional
treaties and protocols, such as the 1970 Hague Convention,51
generally followed the same approach.
In other words, once and to the extent that the vehicles
intended for use by private human spaceflight would be
considered ‘aircraft,’ provided of course the various other requirements for application of the respective conventions would equally be fulfilled, their respective regimes
would also apply on board those private human spaceflight vehicles.
However, whilst on the international level the aforementioned, rather broad definition of ‘aircraft’ would indeed be
applicable as such to most vehicles concerned, at a secondary level this may not be as helpful for applying an extensive and well-weathered set of rules as one might expect. At
the national level, in many cases the application of elaborate
and specially crafted sets of rules is made contingent upon
an aircraft belonging to a specific category of aircraft, referring
to such criteria as size, use and operational characteristics,
or to specific types of operations regardless of the craft used.
The new category of private human spaceflight vehicles respectively flights may fit ill into any of those.
A good example would be existing aviation legislation
applicable to Curaçao, the intended venue for a spaceport to allow flights of the XCOR Lynx vehicle as of 2014.
Would for example, for the purpose of airworthiness certification, such a vehicle qualify as a “utility aircraft,” “acrobatic aircraft,” “light aircraft” or “experimental aircraft”?52
Differences are also made under the regulations between
aircraft of more respectively less than 5,700 kg-where the
Lynx would fit into the latter category.53 And as to operations, the regulations fundamentally differentiate between
such various activities as ‘commercial air traffic,’54 round

trips,’55 “aerial work” flights,56 and ‘special aviation
activities.’57 Each of these enjoy their own set of regulatory
parameters, standards and requirements (semi-) automatically following from characterization of operations as following within their ambit.
It is also illustrative within this context to briefly address the effort which the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)58 started to engage in. This concerned plans to
develop an appropriately specific certification regime for
the craft to engage in suborbital flights—at least to the extent that these qualify as ‘aircraft,’ which most of the current designs do—and, once that regime would be sufficiently developed, start addressing attendant safety issues such
as those related to crew and passenger licensing and certification.59
General acceptance of such an air transport-oriented approach to private human spaceflight is not a foregone conclusion, however. This may be glanced from the fact that the
EASA efforts currently seem to have been put on hold. Equally, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),60
though acknowledging the applicability of the general definition of ‘aircraft’ to most or even all of the vehicles being
designed, has decided to desist from developing Standards
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for such suborbital vehicles or the operations conducted with them.61 This, it was
indicated, at least for as long as the flights concerned would
be from A to A and not, normally, straddle more than one national airspace.
In the end, therefore, it seems that at this stage any broad
and generic application of air law by way of semi-automatic application of the relevant definitions, developed as it is
in detail with a view to ‘normal’ aviation, raises more problems and issues than it solves. Appropriately accommodating (some of the) general principles and concepts of air law
would still require a major development of detailed rules,
regulations and standards almost from scratch-without
the benefit, as of yet, of much relevant statistical data and

49
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Tokyo, done 14 September 1963,
entered into force 4 December 1969; 704UNTS 219; 2 ILM 1042 (1963);
ICAO Doc. 8364. See e.g. Abeyratne, 190--3; Chatzipanagiotis, 43-4.
50
Namely, if “(a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State
[being overflown]; (b) the offence has been committed by or against
a national or permanent resident of such State; (c) the offence is
against the security of such State; (d) the offence consists of a breach
of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State; [or] (e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such State under
a multilateral international agreement”; Art. 4, in conjunction with
Art. 1(2), Tokyo Convention.
51
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hague Convention), The Hague, done 16 December 1970, entered
into force 14 October 1971; 860 UNTS 105; TIAS 7192: lCAO Doc.
8920. Cf. further e.g. Abeyratne, 190-3; Chatzipanagiotis, 44--5.
52
All require airworthiness certificates in conformity with a detailed set of rules; see Sec. 5.4.1.3(1), Civil Aviation Regulations
Netherlands Antilles, Part 5, Airworthiness: P.B. 2008, no. 19.
53
See Art. 128, Landsbesluit toezicht luchtvaart, 24 April 2003: P.B.
2003, no. 56.
54
Cf. Art. 1(v), Luchtvaartlandsverordening, 20 December 2001: P.B.
2001, no. 151; Artt. 112 ff., Landsbesluit toezicht luchtvaart. Art 78(2.a),
Landsbesluit toezicht luchtvaart, moreover limits the categories of aircraft eligible to conduct such ‘commercial air traffic.’

55
Cf. Art 1(o), Luchtvaartlandsverordening; Artt. 1 (gg), 15, Landsbesluit toezicht Iuchtvaart. SXC flights would fit here easily only in
as far as flying ‘space tourists’ would be concerned, but it should
be noted that SXC also intends to offer capacity for scientific experiments and training astronauts.
56
Cf. Sec. 8.1.1.2(1), Civil Aviation Regulations Netherlands Antilles, Part 8, Aircraft Operations; P.B. 2008, no. 22.
57
Cf. Art. 14(1), Luchtvaartlandsverordening.
58
EASA was established by the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil
aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, No.
1592/2002/EC, of 15 July 2002: OJ L 240/1 (2002); later amended by
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European
Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing Council Directive 91/670/
EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC, No.
216/2008/EC, of 20 February 2008: OJ L 79/1 (2008).
59
See in particular Marciacq, 1-18.
60
ICAO was established by the Chicago Convention, notably Artt.
43-90, to develop an international regime for the safety of aviation,
essentially through the development of many SARPs. See also Van
Fenema, 396, 400-3.
61
See Working Paper on Concept of Suborbital Flights, ICAO Council, 175th Session, 30 May 2005, C-WP/12436.
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experience.62 As a consequence being left without ICAO guidance at a global level, individual states respectively EASA for
the European Union would be left to their own devices in developing such rules, regulations and standards, causing already ‘disharmonization’ by the mere fact of diverging fundamentally from the US approach.
This is not to deny the value of using aviation and air law
expertise, just to caution that its use without further ado
should be strictly, consciously and explicitly limited to where
it would be sensible, necessary and workable. The main area
where this would currently seem to be the case would be
criminal air law, since for example addressing the issue of
contractual liability towards passengers has meanwhile taken a different direction—following by and large a high-risk
adventure tourism approach.
4. High-Risk Adventure Tourism Law and Private Human
Spaceflight
Again different in character from the two other branches of law discussed in this paper, high-risk adventure tourism law—or for that matter tourism law in general—hardly knows any international regime. Whilst a World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) has been established in 1975,63
it does not provide for any harmonization or requirement for
national legislation along the lines of for example the Outer
Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Chicago Convention or the Montreal Convention.64 The result is, obviously, a
widely varying array of national regimes generally applicable to tourist activities in the country at issue.
Only in Europe some efforts have been made at an international level to contribute to the establishment of a level
playing field, an Internal Market for tourism, by way of applying at least general consumer rights and related liability
questions in the context of tourist activities in a harmonized
fashion throughout the then-Community, now Union.65
At the same time, it should be noted that the Treaty of
62
Cf., from this perspective, the findings of the US Congress that
“space transportation is inherently risky, and the future of the commercial human space flight industry will depend on its ability to
continually improve its safety performance” (Sec. 50905(1)(12), 51
U.S.C. Chapter 509) and that “the regulatory standards governing
human space flight must evolve as the industry matures so that regulations [do not] stifle technology development” (Sec. 50905(1)(15),
51 U.S.C. Chapter 509).
63
As per Statutes of the World Tourism Organization, Mexico City,
done 27 September 1970, entered into force 2 January 1975; http://
unwto.org/sites/all/files/docpdf/unwtostatuteseng.pdf.
64
Cf. e.g. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Worid Tourism Organization.
65
See e.g. Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts,
93/13/EEC, of 5 April 1993; OJ L 95/29 (1993); Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-toconsumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC
and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of
the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), 2005/29/EC,
of 11 May 2005; OJ L 149/22 (2005); and Council Directive on package travel, package holidays and package tours, 90/314/EEC, of 13
June 1990; OJ L 158/59 (1990). See e.g. O’Brien, Consumer Protection, 229-39; O’Brien, Advertising, 49-59.
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Lisbon,66 whilst allowing for a ‘space competence’ for the European Union, does expressly prohibit relevant follow-on EU
legislative or regulatory activities to result in “any [obligation
of] harmonization of the laws and regulations of the Member
States.”67 This should caution anyone in assuming that specific EU competences in areas which may impact space tourism would automatically apply (or could readily be made to
apply) to space tourism as such and/or other forms of private human spaceflight.
On the other hand, it could be argued that in the absence of
any national “laws and regulations of the Member States”
specifically addressing private human spaceflight (as analyzed before, only the United States has achieved such a feat
in any appreciable detail) the prerequisite for the prohibition
of EU legislative action of a harmonizing character does not
exist in this special context. Thus, similarly to the area of satellite communications where since 1994 a harmonized EU Internal Market began to be developed,68 some legislative action of the EU institutions could after all become warranted, in conformity with the key EU principles of ‘subsidiarity’
and ‘proportionality’69 and linking to the (limited) harmonization already being undertaken in the general tourism consumer context referred to.
The main contribution of tourism law to the future development of a special regime for private human spaceflight,
whether nationally or internationally, may well lie in the concept of ‘informed consent’ and closely related liability waives
and disclaimers, which—with some variations—can be found
in many national jurisdictions when it comes to handling such
(other) high-risk adventure tourist activities as bungee jumping, helicopter-skiing, survivalling and suchlike.70
The United States has used precisely this concept in the context of private human spaceflight, as the regime developed
66
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and
the Treaty establishing the European Community (Treaty of Lisbon),
Lisbon, done 13 December 2007, entered into force 1 December 2009;
OJ C 306/1 (2007).
67
Art. 2, sub § 142(2), Treaty of Lisbon. See further e.g. B. Schmidt
Tedd, Authorisation of Space Activities after the Entry into Force
of the EU Reform Treaty, in F.G. von der Dunk (Ed.), National Space
Legislation in Europe (2011), 300-6; L. Mantl, The European Union, in
C. Brunner & A. Soucek (Eds.), Outer Space in Society, Politics and Law
(2011),412-6; L.J. Smith, EU Competition Law and Issues of National Authorisation of Private Space Activities, in F.G. von der Dunk
(Ed.), National Space Legislation in Europe (2011), 325-31.
68
This process started with the enunciation of Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC and Directive 90/388/EEC in
particular with regard to satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13
October 1994; OJ L 268/15 (1994); which over the years has been followedby an array of further Directives, Regulations and Decisions
increasingly refining the general regime provided by the 1994 Directive. See already Von der Dunk Private Enterprise, 268-74; further
e.g. P. Achilleas & R Loubeyre, Regulatory Framework for Authorising Satellite Applications: The Case of Telecommunications, in L.J.
Smith & I. Baumann (Eds.), Contracting for Space (2011), 102 ff.
69
See Art. 5, Treaty on European Union as amended by the Treaty
of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community, Lisbon, done 13 December
2007, entered into force 1 December 2009; OJ C 115/1 (2009).
70
See Knutson, 105-22; Chatzipanagiotis, 105 ff.; also R. Yates, Minimizing Regulation of Space Tourism to Stimulate Commercial, Private Launch Capabilities, in Proceedings of the Forty-Ninth Colloquium
on the Law of Outer Space (2007), 61 ff.
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under the 2004 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act
allows operators for the time being to offer their flights to
the public on the condition of such informed consent being
given,71 thereby effectively denying contractual liability72—
in stark contrast to the relevant air law regime.
The details of such informed consent may as of yet not have
been fully elaborated, but any major gaps are likely to be
filled once the first licenses for passengers flights will begin
to actually be issued.73 Also, only after the first private suborbital spaceflights would take to the skies and the first unfortunate incidents or accidents would have happened, would
the true value of such ‘informed consent-based waivers of liability’ be tested in the courts—what level of negligence, gross
negligence or wilful misconduct could these ‘waivers’ fend
off?74 It is here, in particular, that high-risk adventure tourism
may provide interesting pointers, or even precedents, for legal disputes regarding such passenger liability issues as these
questions have indeed arisen in legal disputes concerning accidents in other high-risk adventure tourism contexts.
It is also here in particular that the individual US states having enunciated their own statutes, as referred to before, have
made their impact, having have enacted legislation which
further tries to limit possibilities for claimants to circumvent
the ‘informed consent’ and waiver of liability at stake. Thus,
under the Florida Statute, the warning statement part of the
‘informed consent’ requirement reads that “[u]nder Florida
law, there is no liability for an injury to or death of a participant in a spaceflight activity,” and “[y]ou are assuming the
risk of participating in this spaceflight activity.”75
In the case of New Mexico, the model statement on behalf
of a passenger inter alia reads: “3. I therefore understand,
acknowledge and agree that I am waiving all claims” with
respects to risks following from participating in the spaceflight.76 For Texas, the text essentially results in the same
waiver of liability: “I understand and acknowledge that a
space flight entity is not liable” for any relevant injury.77 Finally, the Virginia code also refers to lack of “civil liability”
in these contexts.78
71
See Sec. 70105(b)(5), Commercial Space Launch Act, juncto 14
C.F.R. § 460.45.
72
Licensed private human spaceflight operators are effectively at
liberty to require space flight participants to sign waivers of liability
before allowing them to fly, or could use defenses such as votemi non
fit injuria against relevant liability claims in judicial proceedings. See
Chatzipanagiotis, 110-2.
73
Some general requirements with respect to ‘informed consent’
actually have already been provided by the FAA Human Space
Flight Requirements: known hazards and risks must be made clear
to spaceflight participants, they must be made aware that serious
damage and injury, even death may occur and that the US government has not certified the vehicle concerned as safe for manned
flights, records must be provided to the spaceflight participants of
all manned launch and reentry vehicles of a US nature and the safety record of the particular vehicle at issue must include the number
of flights conducted with it, the number of launch and re-entry accidents and incidents both on the ground and in night, as well as finally whether any corrective actions have been taken in this regard (see
14 C.F.R. § 460.45(a), (b), (c), (d)).
74
See also e.g. Chatzipanagiotis, esp. 111-2.
75
Florida Statute § 331.501 (2009).
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Space Flight Informed Consent Act, SB 009/2011).
77
Title 4, Chapter 100A, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
78
Virginia Code § 8.01227.8, 227.9, 227.10.
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Also, this means that any application of the air law regimes
on contractual liability, at least for the time being, would
only seem to further complicate matters, by interfering with
the application of the ‘informed consent-based waivers.’ It
is true that this may currently be the case formally only in
the United States. However, that state is also the only state
so far having undertaken legislative and regulatory efforts
specifically targeting private human spaceflight, is involved
in most of the advanced projects regarding private human
spaceflight, and finds at least some of the other countries involved tending to follow its example in this respect.
5. Concluding Remarks: Towards a Coherent, Consistent
and Comprehensive Legal Framework for Private Human
Spaceflight’?
One of the overriding issues concerning private human
spaceflight concerns how to properly regulate this specific
new type of activity: part spaceflight, part aircraft operation
and part high-risk adventure tourism (at least for the time being). All three existing sectors to a certain extent enjoy their
specialized legal regimes, each of which has its relevance for
private human spaceflight and is therefore currently being
eyed as providing illustrations, analogies or even examples,
of what the ultimate regime for private human spaceflight
should look like—or being subjected to more straightforward efforts to simply determine them to be applicable.
On the international level, so far the International Civil Aviation Organisation has paid at least some attention to the
need to appropriately regulate private human spaceflight,
in contrast to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space—partly, because the latter has never
been able to arrive at a widely accepted definition of ‘outer
space’ and its lower boundary.
True, COPUOS has first addressed the issue somewhat
tangentially, by having sent to all member states a questionnaire on the issue of definitions and applicable legal regimes for ‘aerospace objects,’ hybrid objects which could fly
both in airspace and in outer space, in 1995.79 That questionnaire, however, resulted in more questions and divergences
of opinion than answers or common views, and could therefore be of little guidance regarding the present discussion.
Secondly, it had then also drafted a questionnaire on the issue of the definition and delimitation of outer space, in 2006
as augmented in 2010.80 Here, however, it is yet too early to
draw any fundamental conclusions from the answers to this
questionnaire.
At the same time, the United States, being furthest on the
road to regulate private human spaceflight, does so largely in the framework of its commercial space launch acts, with
the key licensing competencies resting with the Associate
Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation—which

79
Questionnaire on possible legal issues with regard to aerospace
objects, (A/AC105/C2/1995/CRP.3), based on a Russian working
paper presented in 1992 (A/AC.105/C.2/ L.189). See also further
F.G. von der Dunk, Passing the Buck to Rogers International Liability Issues in Private Spaceflight, 86 Nebraska Law Review (2007), 425.
80
See e.g. Questions on the definition and delimitation of outer space: replies from Member States, Note by the Secretariat (A/
AC105/889/Add.10), of 21 February 2012, § 1.1 & 2.
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is, to be even-handed, part of the Federal Aviation Administration. Certification, so crucial to the safety in the aviation
sector, is for the time being essentially arranged on a voluntary basis, so that the concept of ‘informed consent’ with an
accompanying de facto waiver of liability, well known in the
area of high-risk tourism, rules supreme in balancing the interests in safety with those in stimulating an infant industry.
In Europe, again, it is currently only the European Aviation
Safety Agency which has studied to some extent the possible
approaches to certification of vehicles to be used for private
human spaceflight—on the international level, that is. On a
national level, in the United Kingdom any possible plans to
start launching such flights from Scotland would currently
be considered to fall within the scope of the UK Outer Space
Act, whereas even more specifically in the case of the Dutch
national space act its potential application to (the organization of) tourist flights was—and still is—an issue. Sweden
effectively seems to vacillate between using an aviation approach following FASA’s lead and using the US approach—
essentially a space activity-cumhigh adventure tourism approach—in order not to unduly stifle Virgin Galactic’s plans
to fly from Spaceport Sweden.
In sum: a bewildering array of various legal regimes are
currently being discussed as either already applicable, in
whole or in part, to certain elements or aspects of private
human spaceflight, or to be applied thereto. Obviously, the
overarching requirements for any legal framework to be developed dealing with the particulars of this new category of
highly technological, costly and risky activities, both nationally and internationally, should be coherence, consistency
and as much as possible comprehensiveness—next to transparency, logic and fairness towards the industry, to consumers and to the third-party general public. What is necessary,
consequently, is an integrated approach to start with.
At a second level, if the nascent private human spaceflight
industry is to be stimulated in view of the technological, operational and financial breakthroughs it is expected to gen-
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erate, any overregulation should be avoided. As long as the
general public interests in a fair and appropriate third-party
liability regime, environmentally benign operations and the
peaceful character of all activities concerned are sufficiently safeguarded, one should err on the side of under-regulation, regulating only that which unquestionably both can and
needs to be regulated in precise terms. This should be the ultimate outcome of the integrated approach.
This means, in an ironic twist of history, that to develop a
legal framework allowing the infant space industry to mature in the same manner as the infant aviation industry was
allowed to mature a century ago, space law and not air law
should provide the baseline approach, both nationally and
internationally. At least, that should be the case until private
human spaceflights would become more akin to present-day
aviation in routinely transporting passengers and cargo from
one part of the globe to another. Air law has come a long
way since those early days, and precisely for that reason may
at first result in more obstacles than support and guidance
for development of a legal framework appropriate from this
perspective.
In so applying a ‘space law approach,’ its own current lack
of accommodation of private manned spaceflight as well as
its lack of any relevant internationally harmonized regulation vis-à-vis private manned spaceflight should be acknowledged, and it should be recognized that many other issues
need to be resolved as well. ‘Space law’ should then borrow from high-risk adventure tourism, and integrate the ‘informed consent-cum-waiver of liability’ approach and experience, and borrow from air law only those particular and accurately applicable elements complying with the double criterion of being both possible and necessary to be regulated
in precise terms—currently, it seems this only would apply
to the criminal air law regime. Such an integrated approach
would offer the best balance between the general public interests in safe, environmentally benign and peaceful space activities and the interests of an infant industry yet to take off.

